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DOES THE HATRIDGE CASE "LEGALIZE" USURY?




H atridge v. Home Life & Acc. Ins. Co.,1 a Court of Civil Appeals
case (writ of error was not applied for in the Supreme Court),
held the Texas Credit Insurance Act' to be constitutional. In view of
the conclusions reached by the writer in a previous article' that Sec-
tion 6 of the Credit Insurance Act is unconstitutional, a detailed
study of all possible aspects of the Hatridge case has been made. As
a result of this study, it has become apparent to the writer that the
Hatridge case has no real validity as authority for the constitution-
ality of the Credit Insurance Act. There are at least three reasons
why the case should not be considered as valid authority.
First. The Hatridge case was, to use the politest term possible, a
"test" case.' It was not a real adversary proceeding, which is essential
for a valid judgment.'
Second. The stipulated facts in the Hatridge case did not actually
raise a valid issue as to the constitutionality of Section 6 of the
Credit Insurance Act.!
t This article is the second of a series of articles considering Texas laws pertaining to
the regulation of the small loan and consumer finance business. The author acknowledges
with appreciation assistance in the form of a research grant from the Southwestern Legal
Foundation.
* A.B., University of Akron; LL.B., Southern Methodist University; Professor of Law
and Director of Moot Court Activities, School of Law, Southern Methodist University.
'246 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
'TEXAS INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.53 (Supp. 1956).
'Davis, Does the Texas Credit Insurance Act "Legalize" Usury? 11 Sw. L.J. 139 (1957)
(hereinafter cited as Davis).
' The plaintiff, before and at the time the suit was instituted, was employed by the
legal firm that represented the defendants. The plaintiff's actions in connection with the
suit were directed by a member of the said legal firm. Legal documents filed in the suit
on behalf of both the plaintiff and defendants were prepared in the office of the legal
firm that represented the defendants.
'See U. S. v. Johnson, 319 U. S. 302 (1942); Texas & P. R. R. v. Gay, 86 Tex. 571,
26 S.W. 599, 612 (1894); Wolf v. Butler, 81 Tex. 86, 16 S.W. 794 (1891).
' See Plaintiff's Original Petition and Stipulation Between Plaintiff and Defendants filed
in said case. Although Plaintiff's Original Petition alleged that the defendants "have con-
spired together and devised a scheme for the selling of life, health and accident insurance
in conjunction with the making of loans for the sole purpose of creating a subterfuge in
order that said defendant, V. L. Ware, can receive an unlawful and usurious rate of
interest through commissions paid to him by defendant, Home Life & Accident Insurance
Company," none of these allegations or any facts supporting them were made a part of
the Stipulation Between Plaintiff and Defendants. The Stipulation Between Plaintiff and
Defendants contained no facts showing that the defendants had obtained or contracted
to obtain usurious interest from the plaintiff, so the plaintiff was not entitled to judgment
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Third. The opinion reached an erroneous conclusion that Section 6
of the Texas Credit Insurance Act was constitutional despite the
fact that every authority cited therein was either authority for its
unconstitutionality or was irrelevant to that issue.
The Court of Civil Appeals evidently was not aware that the
Hatridge case was a test case, and its opinion makes no reference to
the argument by the Junior Bar Association of Dallas as amicus
curiae that the stipulated facts did not actually raise a valid issue as
to the constitutionality of the Credit Insurance Act. Therefore this
article will not further consider these two aspects of the case, but
will direct full concentration to the merits of the opinion itself.
Such concentration requires a minute analysis and a careful para-
graph-by-paragraph and sentence-by-sentence reading of that part
of the opinion dealing essentially with Section 6 of the Texas Credit
Insurance Act (hereinafter referred to as "Section 6"). For the con-
venience of the reader every paragraph and sentence so analyzed
will be quoted verbatim. To avoid repetition, frequent reference will
be made to the writer's article "Does the Texas Credit Insurance
Act 'Legalize' Usury?"' where, set out in detail, are legal principles
and authorities pointing to the conclusion that Section 6 of the Texas
Credit Insurance Act is unconstitutional.
The facts as placed before the trial court sitting without a jury,
in the "Stipulation Between Plaintiff and Defendants," were essen-
tially as follows: Plaintiff Hatridge received $200 cash as a loan from
defendant Ware and signed a note for $246.12 payable in twelve
monthly installments of $20.51. The total amount due included
$10.77 as interest collected in advance, $17.10 as the premium for
the purchase of "a credit life, health and accident policy" and $18.25
as the premium for "a hospitalization and surgical expense policy,"
said policies being issued by defendant Home Life & Accident Co.!
It was stipulated that the purchase of credit life, health and accident
insurance with Ware as "first beneficiary" was a condition of loan
but Hatridge was advised he was free to purchase such insurance
regardless of whether the Credit Insurance Act is or is not constitutional. The amicus
curiae brief filed by the Junior Bar Association of Dallas argued this point in some detail.
7 11 Sw. L.J. 139 (1957).
'This stipulation seems to treat the credit life insurance and the credit health and
accident insurance as one policy and the hospitalization and surgical expense insurance
as one policy, apparently in an effort to get a ruling that Section 5 of the Texas Credit
Insurance Act did not prohibit such insurance as being "more than one policy of credit
life insurance or more than one policy of credit health and accident insurance." The
Hatridge opinion, beginning at page 670, rejected the defendants' arguments on this point
and held the writing of the hospitalization and surgical expense insurance to be prohibited
under express language of Section 5. Because the writer believes this part of the opinion
is correct no further analysis of it will be made.
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from any reputable company! It was stipulated that Hatridge re-
quested the purchase of the hospitalization insurance from Ware
and agreed that the premium charged could be added to the face
amount of the note."0 It was stipulated that Ware received the com-
mission on all the policies from the insurance company but the
amount of such commission was not stated.'
About two months after the note was signed and before Hatridge
made any payments thereon his Petition was filed. Hatridge asked
for cancellation of the note upon tender of $200. The defendants
filed a general denial and Ware filed a cross action on the note. The
trial court rendered judgment against plaintiff for the full amount
of the note less unearned interest, holding the Credit Insurance Act
in all respects constitutional.
The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's holding that
the Credit Insurance Act is constitutional. It reformed the judgment,
however, after finding that the transaction violated Section 5 of the
Texas Credit Insurance Act by selling more than "one policy of
credit life, or more than one policy of credit health and accident in-
surance" in connection with one loan. 2 This article will consider
only that part of the opinion dealing with the constitutionality of
the Credit Insurance Act.
It is difficult to pinpoint in the opinion the exact basis for the
court's conclusion that Section 6 is constitutional. Section 11 of
Article XVI of the Constitution of Texas provides that "All con-
tracts for a greater rate of interest than ten per centum per annum,
shall be deemed usurious" and the Legislature "shall provide pains
and penalties to prevent the same." Despite that constitutional ban
on usury, the Hatridge opinion held that the Legislature has the
power to enact a valid statute such as Section 6, which declares
that commissions received by the lender for compulsory credit in-
surance'" "shall be considered for all purposes as compensation for
'This stipulation carefully complies with the "option" requirement of Section 4 of
the Texas Credit Insurance Act.
" This stipulation laid the basis for the freedom of contract argument by defendants,
i.e., that Hatridge was free to purchase hospitalization insurance from anyone he chose.
This argument was rejected by the Hatridge opinion. 246 S.W.2d at 671.
" This stipulation is significant for what it fails to stipulate. The theory of the suit
was that insurance commissions received by lender Ware constituted an unlawful and
usurious rate of interest. See quotation from Plaintiff's Original Petition, note 6, supra.
Yet nowhere in the record is the amount of the commissions stated.
'
2 See notes 8 and 10 supra.
13 Section 4 of the Credit Insurance Act permits the lender to require the borrower




services rendered to such insurer and shall not be taken to be an in-
terest charge on the money borrowed."
Essentially, the basis for such a conclusion seems to be that the
Legislature has power to change the definition of "interest" or power
to declare what shall and what shall not be considered as "interest."
It is obvious that the Legislature does not have such power, for that
would be tantamount to having power to nullify Section 11 of
Article XVI of the constitution."4 The Hatridge opinion does not
seek to explain or overcome the hydra of error thus made.
The Hatridge opinion begins as follows: "The suit in sum is an
attack on Art. 4764c, V.A.C.S. [TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 6.13
(1952)], as unconstitutional." However, in the five-page opinion,
the following paragraph is the only one that seems to deal specifically
with the constitutionality of the statute:
As to validity of this legislation, even if doubtful, we would be re-
quired to sustain it. 9 Tex. Jur., p. 478. Neither are we at liberty to
invalidate it, though in our opinion same may be inexpedient or un-
wise. 9 Tex. Jur., p. 490. It may be said in favor of the measure that
prima facie it protects the small borrower from exorbitant rates, and
coercion of insurance that bears no reasonable relation to the benefits
conferred. Appellant has not demonstrated that Art. 4764c is anywise
in conflict with the constitutional inhibition against usury; and con-
sidered as a whole in view of its emergency clause, the Act evidences a
valid exercise of legislative power."
It seems unfortunate that such scant treatment was given to the
constitutionality of this important statute. In the above paragraph
not one case is cited. There are two references to Texas Jurisprudence,
which upon examination are found to contain generalities not at all
applicable to the problem under consideration. However, to place
the above paragraph in its proper perspective, a detailed analysis of
the opinion leading up to this paragraph will be made so that the
validity of the conclusions in the above paragraph can be tested.
After summarizing the stipulated facts, the opinion quotes article
16, section 11 of the Texas constitution and part of TEXAS REVISED
CIVIL STATUTES ANNOTATED article 5071 (1947). It then states that
it is appellant's contention, in view of the constitutional prohibition
just quoted, that payment to defendant Ware of commissions inci-
dent to the issuance of credit insurance constituted usury or addi-
tional compensation to the lender for the loan of money and that
Section 6, which recites that such payment of commissions "shall not
" See Davis, supra note 3, at 143-49, 156.
'5 246 S.W.2d at 670.
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be taken to be an interest charge on the money borrowed," is in
conflict with the constitution."' The opinion then relates that the
question narrows to a determination of whether said article is a valid
exercise of legislative power and in that connection the following
general discussion is pertinent:
First, 'Whereas the Congress of the United States has only such
powers as are granted by the Federal Constitution, the state legislature
is conceded to be at liberty to pass any act which is not in violation of
some provision of the state or federal constitution.' 9 Tex.Jur., p. 444.
'All power which is not limited by the Constitution inheres in the
people, and an act of a state legislature is legal when the Constitution
contains no prohibition against it.' 11 Am.Jur., p. 619. Watts v. Mann,
Tex.Civ.App., 187 S.W.2d 917, writ ref."
These general observations are true. It is axiomatic that the state
legislature is at liberty to pass any act which is not in violation of
the state or Federal Constitution and that any such act is legal when
the constitution contains no prohibition against it. But the above
quotation is an indication of the assumption made throughout the
opinion that Section 6 is not in violation of the state constitution
and that the constitution contains no prohibition against it. Yet
these were the very questions in issue and to be decided. Watts v.
Mann," cited in the above quotation, is certainly no authority for
upholding the constitutionality of Section 6 of the Act. It upheld
that portion of Article 4646b" giving injunctive powers to the
state against loan brokers as being within the power of the legisla-
ture because the statute carried out the constitutional mandate to
the legislature to prevent usury. The ratio decidendi of Watts v.
Mann makes it strong authority against the constitutionality of Sec-
tion 6 which permits usury in face of the prohibition in the consti-
tution against usury."0 The reasoning in Watts v. Mann sustains the
argument that the Legislature has the power to use means other than
"pains and penalties" to carry out the constitutional mandate to
prevent usury; therefore, in the face of such mandate it cannot have
power to use any means to permit usury."1
The opinion then continues:
Second, aforesaid constitutional provision is self-executing only to the
extent of rendering illegal all usurious contracts. 9 Tex.Jur., p. 423;
16 246 S.W.2d at 667, 668.
17 246 S.W.2d at 668.
"s 187 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) error ref.
'9TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1956).
" For detailed analysis of the effect of Section 6, see Davis, supra note 3, at 149-152.
21For detailed treatment of Watts v. Mann with relation to the Texas Credit Insurance
Act reference is made to Davis, supra note 3, at 147-48.
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Carder v. Knippa Mercantile Co., Tex.Civ.App., 1 S.W.2d 462; Watts
v. Mann, supra; as illustrated by Watson v. Aiken, 55 Tex. 536, and
Hemphill v. Watson, 60 Tex. 679, where the contract itself disclosed a
prohibited rate of interest."
The opinion, in quoting 9 Texas Jurisprudence 423, that the con-
stitutional provision is "self-executing only to the extent of render-
ing illegal all usurious contracts," did not include the next sentence
which reads: "The power and duty of fixing penalties for violation
of the constitutional provision is delegated to the legislature." Carver
v. Knippa Mercantile Co." is cited by Texas Jurisprudence as author-
ity for the latter sentence. That case indicates that the legislature
may have the power to fix a penalty where more than 6 per cent
interest is charged in situations where there is no agreement between
the parties as to the interest rate. Also the case is authority for the
fundamental proposition that the legislature cannot pass legislation
to convert usurious contracts into legal ones. It recognizes that the
constitutional provision is self-executing to the extent of rendering
illegal all usurious contracts and that the legislature has the duty
to fix penalties for usury. The exact statement of the court was:
This provision is self-executing to the extent only of rendering usuri-
ous contracts illegal, and to the Legislature was delegated the power
and duty of fixing penalties for violations of the constitutional pro-
vision. Hemphill v. Watson, 60 Tex. 679; Quinlan's Estate v. Smye, 21
Tex.Civ.App. 156, 50 S.W. 1068.24
The use of the qualifying word "only" was to make it clear that
the constitution itself does not provide penalties for usury but placed
with the legislature the power-and the duty-to provide penalties.
Watts v. Mann" is again cited in this quotation. That case affirmed
Carder v. Knippa Mercantile Co. in holding that the constitution
itself makes all usurious contracts illegal and that the legislature has
a mandate to prevent such contracts. Therefore both cases stand for
legal principles contrary to the Hatridge decision and Section 6."
The cited cases of Watson v. Aiken" and Hemphill v. Watson28
contain no authorities or principles favorable to the Hatridge de-
cision or to Section 6, for the contracts in each case were found to
be usurious under the self-executing provision of the constitution
22 246 S.W.2d at 668-69.
231 S.W.2d 462 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) error dism.
241 S.W.2d 462 at 463.
21 See note 18, supra.
26 See notes 20 and 21, supra.
2155 Tex. 536 (1881).
2860 Tex. 679 (1884).
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alone. When these cases arose the legislature had not yet passed acts
setting out "pains and penalties" to prevent usury. On the other
hand, these cases are clearly authority for holding usurious such con-
tracts as Section 6 attempts to legalize, under the self-executing
provisions of the constitution alone. It is to be noted that the
Hatridge opinion, in citing Hemphill v. Watson, follows with the
statement that ". . . the contract itself disclosed a prohibited rate
of interest."'" This statement could be taken to mean that Hemphill
v. Watson is authority that the constitutional provision is self-exe-
cuting only when a contract shows on its face that it is for a usuri-
ous rate of interest. But no such limitation is found in that case or
any of the other cases holding article 16, section 11 of the constitu-
tion to be self-executing." Also, there are many Texas cases in which
the courts have looked behind the contracts to determine whether
the contracts were in fact usurious regardless of the words used on
their face."
The opinion then states:
Nor does the Constitution define 'interset,' Art. 16, sec. 11, not
being worded so as to create actionable rights and enforceable remedies
in all cases without the aid of legislation."
The meaning of this sentence or its application to the facts of the
case is not immediately apparent. The implication of this sentence,
coupled with later statements in the opinion," seems to be that the
legislature has the power to say what is or is not "interest," since
"interest" is not defined in the constitution; and that in some cir-
cumstances there may be usurious contracts where no actionable
rights and enforceable remedies exist under the constitution because
not given "aid of legislation."
While it is true the constitution does not define interest, the use
of the word "interest" in the usury provision of the constitution
was necessarily with a definite and specific meaning. 4 And it may be
true that article 16, section 11 does not of itself create actionable
rights and enforceable remedies in all cases of usury, without the aid
29 See p. 438, supra.
"o Carder v. Knippa Mercantile Co., 1 S.W.2d 462 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error dism.;
Watts v. Mann, 187 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) error ref.; Glenn v. McCarty,
130 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939), aff'd, 138 Tex. 16, 155 S.W.2d 912 (1941).
"Schmid v. City Nat'l Bank, 132 Tex. 115, 114 S.W.2d 854 (1938); Graham &
Locke Investment Co. v. Madison, 295 S.W.2d 234, 243 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref.
n.r.e.; Autocredit of Ft. Worth, Inc. v. Pritchett, 223 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949) error dism.; and cases cited in 42 TEx. JuR., Usury § 8 (1936).
32 246 S.W.2d at 669.
"3See p. 443, infra.4 For development of this point of constitutional law see Davit-, supra note 3, at 143-44.
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of legislation. Nevertheless, by virtue of article 16, section 11, all
contracts for a greater rate of interest than ten per cent per annum
are usurious, whether there is or is not "aid of legislation."" In all
such cases, because of the self-executing aspects of article 16, section
11, the borrower has been able to get relief from usurious interest,
though technically he may not have been given "actionable rights
and enforceable remedies" by "aid of legislation.""
The opinion, in the above quoted sentence, seems to be stating a
converse proposition to the prime issue under consideration. Under
the constitutional mandate to the legislature any "aid of legislation"
is to "provide appropriate pains and penalties to prevent" usurious
contracts. Under consideration by the court was whether Section 6,
in saying commissions received by lenders "shall be considered for all
purposes as compensation for services rendered to such insurer and
shall not be taken to be an interest charge on the money borrowed"
was legislation permitting usurious contracts. It is elementary that
statements and authorities used to uphold legislation designed to
carry out the mandate to prevent usurious contracts cannot be
validly used to uphold legislation designed to circumvent the con-
stitutional provision against usurious contracts.
The opinion concludes the paragraph the writer has been quoting
from as follows:
... Following the 1891 amendment, sec. 11, Art. 16, the Legislature
proceeded to define interest as 'compensation allowed by law or fixed
by the parties to a contract for the use or forbearance or detention of
money', with conventional interest at not exceeding 10%, Art. 5069,
and legal interest at 6%, Art. 5070; usury being defined as 'interest in
excess of the amount allowed by law;' with Art. 5071, already quoted
in part, supplying other deficiencies."
The definition of interest by the legislature in article 5069 as
quoted above is the common law definition."8 It is therefor a proper
definition of interest because it conforms to the meaning of interest
as used in the constitution. The legislature has not changed the defi-
nition of interest. It cannot legally change the constitutional mean-
ing of interest in a manner that would permit usurious contracts."
"Hemphill v. Watson, 60 Tex. 679 (1894); Watson v. Aiken, 55 Tex. 536 (1881).
3" Ibid and the following cases: Roberts v. Coffin, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 127, 53 S.W. 597
(1899); Quinlan's Estate v. Smye, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 155, 50 S.W. 1068 (1899); Dunman
v. Harrison, 41 S.W. 499 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897).
3 246 S.W.2d at 669.
"s The element of "detention" of money first appeared in the Texas Revised Statutes of
1879 so the present constitutional provision against usury which became effective in 1891
adopted the element of "detention" in the definition of interest. See Parks v. Lubbock,
92 Tex. 635, 51 S.W. 322 (1899).
so For a detailed discussion of this point see Davis, supra note 3, at 143-49.
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There is authority that the legislature may broaden the concept of
interest for the purpose of carrying out the constitutional mandate
to prevent usury," just as it may create additional remedies for that
purpose.4'
However, the legislature in section 6 undertakes to decree that
commissions received by lenders for compulsory credit insurance on
the borrowers ". . . shall not be taken to be an interest charge on
the money borrowed." Yet such commissions, when received as com-
pensation for the use of money, come within the definition of interest
in article 5069; come within the constitutional meaning of interest,
and come within the meaning of interest in all previous court deci-
sions. A crucial question in the Hatridge case was whether the legis-
lature had the power to decree by statute that compensation in the
guise of compulsory credit insurance commissions received by lenders
for the use of money shall not be interest; this in the face of its own
definition of interest as compensation for the use of money and in
the face of the constitutional meaning of interest and as laid down
by the courts. It is axiomatic that the legislature has no such power,
because, if it did, article 16, section 11 of the constitution would be
absolutely meaningless."
The opinion proceeds:
Third, 'Admittedly a lender may, without violating the usury law,
make an extra charge for any distinctly separate and additional con-
sideration other than the simple lending of the money (42 Tex.Jur.
932; Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 102 S.W.2d 1046; 109 A.L.R.
1464) ; ***.' Greever v. Persky, 140 Tex. 64, 165 S.W.2d 709, 712. 43
This dictum from Greever v. Persky" is misleading unless placed
in its proper context. First, the quotation contains a qualification in
that the lender "may," without violating the usury law, make an
extra charge for any distinctly separate and additional consideration
other than for the lending of money. But even this statement is not
true if such extra charge is made with usurious intent.
4
'
Second, the quotation begs an important question involved in
Section 6 and the Hatridge case, namely, whether the credit insur-
ance commissions arising from compulsory credit insurance were re-
ceived by the lender as compensation for the use of money or were
4 0 Parks v. Lubbock, 92 Tex. 635, 51 S.W. 322 (1899).
"' Watts v. Mann, 187 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) error ref.
42 See notes 14 and 39, supra. Also see Donaldson, Small Loan Legislation in Texas,
20 TEXAS L. REV. 186, 190 n.8 (1941).
4 246 S.W.2d at 669.
44 140 Tex. 64, 165 S.W.2d 709, 712 (1942).
4'Glover v. Buchnan, 104 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error dism.
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an innocent extra charge for a distinct, separate and additional con-
sideration to the borrower.
Applied as a test of Section 6, the inquiry is whether commissions
received by the lender for the compulsory credit insurance are in-
variably "an extra charge for any distinctly separate and additional
consideration other than the simple lending of money." Obviously
the answer is no, because the very intent of the statute and the lend-
er is that he receive such commission as additional consideration for
the simple lending of money." Even the stipulated facts in the
Hatridge case do not show that Ware received the commissions for
"any distinctly separate additional consideration" other than the
loan. The Supreme Court in Greever v. Persky held as a matter of
law that Greever, in procuring money from a bank on his own credit
and security and then lending to Persky, did not render any service
to Persky other than the lending of money for which he had no
right to charge a commission or bonus. It is authority against the
constitutionality of Section 6 and is authority against the decision in
the Hatridge case.
Nevels v. Harris," cited in the above quotation, is not authority
for the constitutionality of Section 6, for it held that fees paid out
of the loan to the inspector of the land and the attorney examining
the title and drawing up the legal papers were not interest, where the
"... lender does not participate in the fund so paid." The purpose
of Section 6 is to permit the lender to participate in the fund so
paid. The stipulated facts in the Hatridge case were that the lender
Ware received the commissions and thereby was permitted to "par-
ticipate in the funds so paid." The Nevels case, too, is authority
against the constitutionality of Section 6 and the decision in the
Hatridge case.
The opinion then states:
'A collateral transaction between the borrower and lender, whereby the
lender may take profit, will not render the loan usurious when such
transaction was entered into in good faith and without usurious intent.'
C. C. Slaughter Co. v. Eller, Tex.Civ.App. 196 S.W. 704, syl. 14 .4
This is not an accurate statement of the law. There are numerous
cases holding that if the arrangements, although set up under
ostensibly legal forms, including collateral transactions, result in the
4For detailed treatment of this point see Davis, supra note 3, at 152-54. The Hatridge
opinion itself says that the purpose of the Act is to render bona fide any transaction
made in accordance with its terms. See pp. 451, 52 infra.
47 129 Tex. 190, 102 S.W.2d 1046 (1937).
46 246 S.W.2d at 669.
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lender collecting usurious interest, the element of the actual intent
of the parties is not essential." But even if this statement is taken at
face value it is very unfavorable to the constitutionality of Section
6, for it requires an actual, bona fide collateral transaction made in
good faith and without usurious intent; whereas Section 6 attempts
to make the compulsory credit insurance a "collateral" transaction
by legislative fiat, and then attempts to legalize the "collateral"
transaction irrespective of good or bad faith or usurious intent. And
the statement is also unfavorable to the Hatridge decision, because
the stipulated facts in the Hatridge case were that "as a condition of
loan" Hatridge had to purchase credit life, health and accident in-
surance. So it was not and could not be a "collateral" transaction,
nor was it stipulated that this was a collateral transaction entered into
in good faith and without usurious intent. And again, the decision
of the case from which the above quotation was extracted is not
authority favorable to the constitutionality of Section 6, nor to the
decision in the Hatridge case. Usury was pleaded but the court held
that usury was in no event decisive of the appeal, therefore the as-
signments of error on the question of usury were not considered in
detail, but the court stated the law for the guidance of the lower
court on another trial.
And then the opinion states:
And Fourth, the power of the Legislature to broaden the common
law definition of 'interest' was recognized by the Supreme Court in
Parks v. Lubbock, 92 Tex. 635, 51 S.W. 322; and recent Legislatures
have given further sanction to the rule stated in Greever v. Persky,
supra, by declaring that certain things, including insurance premiums,
should not be regarded as interest. See Art. 342-508, V.A.S., Texas
Banking Code; Art. 4646b, V.A.S., the latter statute having been held
constitutional: Watts v. Mann, supra; Wooldridge v. State, Tex.Civ.
App., 183 S.W.2d 746; Wilkenfeld v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 189 S.W.2d
80. 50
This statement seems to imply that the legislature has the con-
stitutional power to declare what shall and what shall not be inter-
est, irrespective of its own definition of interest, the common law
definition of interest, and the constitutional meaning of interest.
"'Sledge v. Murphy, 284 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Donoghue v. State, 211
S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e.; Federal Mortgage Co. v. State Nat'l
Bank, 254 S.W. 1002 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) error dism.; Joy v. Provident Loan Soc'y,
37 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), judgment reformed and aff'd, 124 Tex. 583,
80 S.W.2d 942 (1935). And see Graham & Lock Investments v. Madison, 295 S.W.2d
234, 243 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.
" 246 S.W.2d at 669.
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That the legislature has no such power has already been dealt with. 1
That the authority cited in the opinion in no wise upholds such a
proposition will next be discussed.
The Supreme Court held in Parks v. Lubbock"2 that the legislature
had power to add to the common law definition of "interest" the
charge made by a lender for the borrower's detention of money. At
common law the lender would charge the borrower an exorbitant
rate for the time the borrower detained the money after maturity,
under the guise that the charge was a "penalty" and not "interest"
and therefore not usurious. The legislature closed this obvious loop-
hole, and in doing so it was carrying out the constitutional mandate
to prevent usury. Parks v. Lubbock is not authority that the legis-
lature has the power to narrow the common law definition of in-
terest or change said definition in any way that would thwart the
constitutional mandate to prevent usury. Parks v. Lubbock and
Watts v. Mann 3 are analogous in that both cases recognize and ap-
prove legislation designed to prevent and penalize usury, as directed
by the constitution.
The Hatridge opinion misinterprets the words used in article 342-
508' and article 4646b."' A consideration of the constitutionality of
these statutes is not within the scope of this article. However, neither
of these statutes declares in substance or otherwise that insurance
premiums "shall not be regarded as interest" as is indicated in the
above quotation. In the writer's opinion there is no reasonable way
to extract such an interpretation from the words of these statutes.
Article 342-508, the only one which uses the word "insurance,"
states in part:
... Provided, however, a bank may require an applicant for a loan or
discount to pay the cost of any abstract, attorney's opinion or title in-
suranre policy, or other form of insurance, and filing or recording fees
or appraisal fees.
Nowhere is this sentence qualified. The borrower, in paying the costs
for the items listed in the quoted sentence is not paying "interest"
if said costs are not intended to be for the use of money; but the
statute does not attempt, as does Section 6, to preclude a showing
that said costs were extracted for the use of money and therefore
interest.
51 See pp. 436, 39, 40, supra.
5292 Tex. 635, 51 S.W. 322 (1899).
53 See note 18, supra.
4 Texas Banking Code, TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1956).
5'TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1956).
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The impression given by this portion of the Hatridge opinion is
that the Legislature declared in article 4646b that "certain things,
including insurance premiums, shall not be regarded as interest;"
that such a declaration is correct and legal because article 4646b
has been held constitutional. But such is unquestionably wrong, for
article 4646b in nowise deals with or mentions insurance. Also, it
was only that part of article 4646b creating injunctive powers
against habitual usurious lenders that was held constitutional, on the
basis that its purpose was to help carry out the constitutional man-
date to the legislature to prevent usury."
Section 2a of article 4646b reads in part as follows:
Nothing in this Act shall in any way modify, alter or change any valid
provision of Article 8 of Chapter 5 of House Bill Number 79, Acts of
the Regular Session, 48th Legislature [Article 342-508, Texas Banking
Code] nor shall anything in this Act prevent charging of any actual
and necessary expense, now or hereafter permitted and authorized by
law, and such shall not be considered interest.
In the trial of any application for injunction under this Act there
shall exist a prima facie presumption that the actual and necessary
expenses of making any such loan was One ($1.00) Dollar for each
Fifty ($50.00) Dollars, or fractional part thereof loaned ...
Watts v. Mann did not pass on whether section 2a is valid or invalid
as an attempt to change or narrow the definition of interest.
Section 2a of article 4646b was involved in Wooldridge v. State,"'
another stipulated case where the agreed statement of facts between
the county attorney and the lender did not really raise the issue of
the constitutionality of section 2a of article 4646b. The court did
not actually pass on its constitutionality. There is dicta to the effect
that it is constitutional because it did not permit any charges for-
bidden by the constitution and its only effect was to create a prima
facie presumption that a charge made by the lender was to cover the
actual expense of making the loan, if it was not more than $1.00
for each $50.00 loaned. The parties agreed that the lender collected
ten per cent interest and that a "service charge" was made as per-
mitted under section 2a of article 4646b. It was alleged that such
charge was not "for the use and detention of money but to pay the
reasonable costs of making the loan." The trial court found the
statute unconstitutional and restrained the defendant from collect-
ing the "service charge" upon any loan made by him. The exact de-
cision of the Court of Civil Appeals was that it was incumbent upon
36 See notes 19, 25 and 26, supra.
57 183 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) error ref. w.o.m.
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the state to prove that the "service charges" made by the defendant
were not for legitimate expenses of making the loans and since the
stipulated facts did not reveal whether the "service charges" were
legal or illegal, the State had not sustained its burden of proof, so
the judgment of the trial court was reversed and the cause remanded.
It is very significant that the Court of Civil Appeals refused to
hold that the "service charges" were legal even in the face of the
agreed stipulation that they were made pursuant to section 2a of
article 4646b and the allegations of defendant lender that they were
not for the use and detention of money but to pay the reasonable
costs of making the loans. As discussed later in this article in detail,8
the Hatridge opinion erroneously uses the analogous situation in the
stipulated facts and allegations in that case to uphold the consti-
tutionality of Section 6. The Wooldridge v. State opinion recog-
nized that irrespective of statutory authorization, the real test was
whether the lender in making the "service charges" was adding legi-
timate expenses of making the loans or was charging for the use of
money. Contrast this with the effect of Section 6 and the decision
of the Hatridge case in nullifying any such test.
Wilkenfeld v. State," also cited in the part of the Hatridge opinion
quoted above, agreed with Watts v. Mann that article 4646b is con-
stitutional in giving the state power to enjoin habitual money lenders
from charging usurious interest.
Omitting the next portion of the opinion making general state-
ments about the Credit Insurance Act, the opinion then states:
Even prior to effective date of the statute under consideration, this
Court had held that a requirement of personal insurance as additional
security to the lender was lawful, 'provided the plan is not a cover for
usurious loans.' Texas Finance & Thrift Assn. v. State, Tex.Civ.App.
224 S.W.2d 522, 523.D
This sentence carries several possible implications which will now
be considered. The use of the word "even" could mean that if re-
quiring personal insurance as a condition of the loan was lawful
without a statute, it doubtless would be lawful when authorized by
a statute. The sentence cites Texas Finance & Thrift Ass'n v. State
as holding that such requirement was lawful. This is incorrect. The
holding in that case was that a temporary injunction mandatorily
requiring a lender to cease writing credit insurance as a condition
of loan changed the status quo and accomplished the sole objective
"See pp. 449-51 and nn. 73-77 infra.
59 189 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
60 246 S.W.2d at 669.
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sought by a final injunction. Therefore the trial court's order was
modified to restrain defendant
,. . from demanding, receiving or by the use of any means attempting
to collect from the borrower usurious interest on account of any loan,
or from thereafter charging any borrower usurious interest, or contract-
ing for any usurious interest. ... "
The Court of Civil Appeals in the Texas Finance & Thrift Ass'n
case did by way of dicta state:
First, it is to be observed that the notes in question are prima facie law-
ful, providing for no more than ten per cent interest. So also, we think
is the requirement for insurance as an additional security to the small
lender, provided the plan is not a cover for usurious loans. The latter
statement is made in view of Section 2a, Art. 4646b, making Art.
342-508, State Banking Code, a part thereof ....
The Hatridge opinion admits that the "holding" in Texas Finance
& Thrift v. State that section 2a of article 4646b made article 342-
508, Texas Banking Code, a part thereof was "not entirely accurate"
in view of the holding in Wooldridge v. State." One of the specific
holdings in the latter case was that section 2a of article 4646b did
not make article 342-508, Texas Banking Code, a part thereof."
So the above quoted dicta was based on the erroneous assumption
that a statute regulating bank loans had been incorporated into a
statute dealing with small-loan lenders.
However, even the above quoted sentence from the Texas Finance
& Thrift Ass'n opinion, when taken at its face value, is good author-
ity against the Hatridge decision and the constitutionality of Sec-
tion 6. The opinion in the above quotation is saying that a require-
ment of personal insurance is lawful with the qualification "provid-
ed the plan is not a cover for usurious loans." The main issue that
presumably was before the court in the Hatridge case was whether
the credit insurance plan Ware operated under was a cover for usuri-
ous loans and did the plan result in Ware's receiving additional com-
pensation beyond the constitutional ten per cent per annum for the
use of money. The Original Petition filed in behalf of Hatridge made
61Texas Finance & Thrift Ass'n v. State, 224 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
2 1d. at 523.
63 246 S.W.2d at 669 n.2.
64 183 S.W.2d 746 at 749: "In reaching the conclusions we have made, we are of the
opinion that the provisions of Article 8 of 'The Banking Code' cannot be made to apply
to the appellant or to any other person, firm, association or corporation by and through
the 'negative' language that was employed in the Act under discussion and its Section 2a.
We believe that to effect such a purpose it is necessary to amend 'The Banking Code'
so as to affirmatively include appellant and others situated as he, or that such provisions
of said 'Code' as the Legislature may desire to make applicable to appellant and others
should have been or should be re-enacted in the Act here under review."
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such allegations but they were not passed on in the opinion in the
Hatridge case. There is no further discussion or consideration as to
whether the plan was or was not a cover for a usurious loan. This
for the reason that the opinion assumes the validity of Section 6,
and Section 6 precludes any inquiry as to whether the plan of credit
insurance is or is not a cover for usurious loans. Yet one of the rea-
sons Section 6 is invalid is that in attempting to decree that credit
insurance commissions received by the lender "shall not be taken to
be an interest charge on the money borrowed" it forecloses con-
sideration as to whether the credit insurance plan is a cover for
usurious loans."5
The Hatridge opinion then states:
Other recent decisions involving personal insurance in connection
with loans prior to Art. 4764c, are Denton v. Ware, Tex.Civ.App.,
228 S.W.2d 867, Ware v. Heath, Tex.Civ.App., 241 S.W.2d 362, and
Rodriguez v. R. P. Youngberg Finance, Ltd., Tex.Civ.App., 241
S.W.2d 815; the case first cited holding that the charge for insurance
evidenced a benefit conferred under the contract aside from the use of
money-not interest; the second merely holding that the contract was
one of insurance. In the Rodriguez appeal, the transaction involved
more than $1,000 and occurred just prior to enactment of Art. 4764c;
yet many regulations of the State Insurance Board involving identical
subject matter has been promulgated and were in force. In the course
of its opinion, the El Paso Court was required to discuss sec. 6, here
under attack; holding that insurance expense made part of the loan
(same as in the instant case) was clearly an additional benefit to the
borrower, inclusion thereof not rendering the contract usurious. 6
Denton v. Ware"' is another "stipulated" case involving the same
V. L. Ware, a defendant in the Hatridge case. The above quotation
from the latter case does not accurately state the decision in Denton
v. Ware, which was that a loan contract which cancelled the debt
in event of death and cancelled the payments in event of disability
was not insurance but was considered by the court "merely as con-
taining a waiver of collection of the debt in the event of the hap-
pening of the named contingencies."" Denton v. Ware also held
that the payment for the "waiver" was not interest and under the
stipulated facts and the allegations there was no other way it could
85 The legislature has no power to foreclose judicial inquiry either by its fiat or by an
attempt to change the meaning of words used in the constitution. This is usurpation of
the function of the judiciary. See Powell v. State, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 345 (1884); Ex parte
Anderson, 81 S.W. 973 (Tex. Crim. App. 1904); Keller v. State, 87 S.W. 669 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1905).
86246 S.W.2d at 669-70.




hold. Thus the case is not authority in support of the Hatridge de-
cision.
Ware v. Heath"9 involved the very same type of contract used by
V. L. Ware, but it was there held that the contract was one of in-
surance and on that point the case is in conflict with Denton v. Ware
though purporting to distinguish it. The facts and pleadings in Ware
v. Heath did not raise any question of interest, usurious or other-
wise.7 So Ware v. Heath is not authority for the Hatridge decision
or for the constitutionality of Section 6.
Rodriguez v. Youngberg" is not authority for the Hatridge de-
cision or the validity of Section 6 because the trial court found and
recited in its judgment that the charges for credit insurance were
"tnot a subterfuge for the collection of additional interest." There
were no findings of fact or conclusions of law requested, so the Court
of Civil Appeals, seeing no facts in the record to refute such findings,
upheld the trial court on that finding.
The opinion then states:
The agreed stipulations do not show the percentage of commission
retained by Ware or that the premium charged was in excess of rates
promulgated by the Board, and in consequence, we must assume a com-
pliance with regulations in that respect."2
It is of interest to note the "agreed stipulations" and what they fail
to show. They fail to show the amount of the commissions received
by the lender, yet said commissions are the purported basis for the
entire case.
Then comes an amazing bit of legal sleight-of-hand in the opinion.
It states:
From the cases cited in 42 Tex.Jur. 932, it would appear that when
not governed by statute, each case turns on its own facts as to whether
the transaction involving an additional charge is one made in good
faith, distinct from a charge for use of money; in other wordr, a mere
device or cover for usury. But where the matter of the collateral
transaction is regulated by a valid statute, which is complied with,
there can be no issue of fact as to good faith concerning a benefit
allowed thereunder in addition to interest.73
First is set up the erroneous premise that only when not governed
69237 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
70 Id. at 363: "The only question necessary to be decided in that case [Denton v. Ware]
was whether or not the loan transaction was usurious, a question which is not before us,
since neither of the parties has raised it on appeal."
7'241 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
7' 246 S.W.2d at 670.
73 Ibid.
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by statute does each case "turn on its own facts." Neither 42 Tex.
Jur. 932 nor the cases therein cited limit the test to cases not
governed by statute."' Under the constitution every case, whether
governed by statute or not, turns upon its own facts as to whether
the transaction involving an additional charge is one made in good
faith for an additional consideration distinct from a charge for use
of money. If it is an additional charge for the use of money it is
interest regardless of good or bad faith. '
The main reason why Section 6 is unconstitutional is because it
attempts to foreclose inquiry on the issue of whether the lender in
receiving compulsory credit insurance commissions receives them as
additional compensation for the use of his money.
The above quotation from the Hatridge opinion actually means
that the good faith or usurious intent of the lender cannot be ques-
tioned regardless of the nature of the compensation he receives, as
long as he complies with the regulations of a "valid" statute."6 Here
74 42 TEx. JuR. 932 may have been an inadvertent mis-citation for its language has
no relationship to the court's statement. The following cases cited in 42 TEX. JUR. 932
have been examined: National Bond and Mortgage Corp. v. Mahanay, 70 S.W.2d 236
(Tex. Civ. App. 1934), modified, 124 Tex. 544, 80 S.W.2d 947 (1935); Forreston State
Bank v. Brooks, 51 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); Joy v. Provident Loan Soc'y,
37 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) error dism.; Independent Lumber Co. v. Gulf
State Bank, 299 S.W. 939 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) error ref.; Hudmon v. Foster, 210
S.W. 262 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918); Slaughter Co. v. Eller, 196 S.W. 704 (Tex. Civ. App.
1917). None of them contains language supporting the court's qualification "when not
governed by statute." In fact, in joy v. Provident Loan Society, supra, the lender tried
without avail to take refuge behind the "Pawnbrokers Act," Articles 6145-61 sub. 48,
TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1956), as exempting him from the general law of
usury.
" The cases on this point are almost unlimited. Some of the Texas cases are: Temple
Trust Co. v. Swell, 133 Tex. 417, 126 S.W.2d 943 (1939); Schmid v. City Nat'l Bank,
132 Tex. 115, 114 S.W.2d 854 (1938); Walker v. Temple Trust co., 124 Tex. 575,
80 S.W.2d 935 (1935); Graham & Locke Investment Co. v. Madison, 295 S.W.2d 234,
243 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.; Sledge v. Murphy, 284 S.W.2d 938 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1955); Autocredit of Ft. Worth, Inc. v. Pritchett, 223 S.W.2d 951 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1949) error dism.; Donoghue v. State, 211 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948)
error ref. n.r.e.; Standard Supply and Hardware Co. v. Christian-Carpenter Drilling Co.,
183 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) error ref.; Glenn v. McCarty, 130 S.W.2d 295
(Tex. Civ. App. 1939), aff'd, 137 Tex. 608, 155 S.W.2d 912 (1941); Glover v. Bushman,
104 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error dism.; Commerce Trust Co. v. Best, 54
S.W.2d 1037 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), judgm. reformed and aff'd, 124 Tex. 583, 80
S.W.2d 942 (1935); Joy v. Provident Loan Soc., 37 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931)
error dism.; Federal Mortgage Co. v. State Nat'l Bank, 254 S.W.1002 (Tex. Civ. App.
1923) error dism.; Henry v. Sanson, 21 S.W. 69 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893). Some cases
involving TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 881 et seq. (1948) [the Building and Loan
Statute] which has been held constitutional and where the court used the test of good
faith, are Mack v. North American Bldg. E Loan Ass'n, 60 S.W.2d 1099 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1933) and Hampton v. Guaranty State Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 63 S.W.2d 873 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1933).
76 Even though the validity of the statute be assumed, the court is incorrect in saying
"there can be no issue of fact as to good faith concerning a benefit allowed thereunder."
Wooldridge v. State, 183 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944), discussed p. 446 supra, was
reversed for a new trial to go into just such an issue of fact. Also see discussion of
Continental Savings & Building Ass'n v. Wood, p. 451, infra.
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is a classic example of one pulling oneself up by one's own boot-
straps. The very question that is supposed to be at issue is the validity
of the statute. The opinion assumes its validity and this enables the
opinion to give the appearance of foreclosing the very consideration
that reveals its invalidity. The statute is invalid because it precludes
an inquiry into the issue of whether the lender receives the com-
pensation in good faith for something other than the use of money
or whether the lender receives the compensation for the use of money
under a device or cover for usury. But by legal acrobatics the ques-
tion to be decided is assumed and such assumption prevents inquiry
into the factors that must be considered in deciding the question.
It is then stated:
The purpose of Art. 4764c is to render bona fide any transaction
made in accordance with its terms, just as under Art. 881 et seq.,
V.A.S., a building and loan association cannot 'be adjudged to have
devised a scheme to conceal usury if all its actions were authorized by
a valid statute.' Continental Savings & Building Ass'n v. Wood,
Tex.Civ.App., 33 S.W.2d 770, 772, affirmed, Tex. Com. App., 56
S.W.2d 641; 42 Tex.Jur., p. 888. v7
Here is the stark admission that the purpose of the statute is to
render bona fide any transaction made in accordance with its terms.
Against the background heretofore developed, such purpose can only
be unconstitutional. The constitution says and all the other cases
have said that any transaction the purpose of which is to give the
lender more than ten per cent per annum for the use of money is
illegal and usurious. The Hatridge opinion here reveals itself as
never really considering the basic constitutional issues.
Articles 852-881b7' regulate building and loan associations. A
consideration of their constitutionality is not within the scope of
this paper. However, it has no provision comparable to Section 6
and none of its provisions attempt to foreclose inquiry as to what is
or is not interest. Continental Say. d Bldg. Ass'n v. Wood," from
which the Hatridge opinion extracts the above quote, does not hold
that such inquiry is foreclosed. The Commission of Appeals in affirm-
ing the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion in the Wood case stated:
. . . In other words, there is no allegation in the plaintiffs' petition
that the contract was executed through fraud, accident, or mistake.
An inspection of the statement of facts shows that the contract was
the usual one contemplated to be made by virtue of the provisions of
title 24, articles 852-881, R. S. 1925, authorizing the organization and
77 246 S.W.2d at 670.
71 TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1956).
7933 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930), aff'd, 56 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. Comm. App.).
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operation of building and loan associations. It may be that in fact
this particular transaction was usurious, but the record in this case
shows that it was not. It is true that the testimony of the plaintiffs
in error, considered alone and assumed to be true, demonsrates be-
yond the peradventure of a doubt that they did not intend to pur-
chase any stock in this association, and that they did not intend to pay
any commission fees, and that they did not intend to become obligat-
ed to pay any membership fees in the association, and also that they
did not agree to pay any broker's fee, but, when we examine their
pleadings, we find no basis upon which to rest this testimony. They
merely allege that the scheme by which the defendant in error was
enabled to collect the amount of money it did collect from them was
a device to charge usurious interest. But the testimony shows that this
scheme was one expressly authorized by the statutes of the state, and
therefore could not legally have been a usurious one, in the absence of
allegations and proof to the effect that by some fraudulent act on the
part of defendant in error, or its authorized agent, or some accident
or rmistake on the part of the plaintiffs in error, who executed the in-
strument, the execution of the same was procured to the detriment of
the person executing it, so as to render the act, apparently legal, an
illegal one."' (Emphasis added.)
This language is in great contrast to the Hatridge opinion, which
states categorically: "The purpose of Art. 4764c is to render bona
fide any transaction made in accordance with its terms. . . ." (Em-
phasis added.) It seems too obvious for further comment that there
can be no such legislative fiat that would foreclose judicial inquiry
into the bona fides of a compulsory credit insurance loan transac-
tion."
The opinion then concludes its treatment of the constitutionality
of the Credit Insurance Act with the paragraph previously quoted
on page 436 supra. For convenience the pertinent part of this para-
graph is again quoted:
As to the validity of this legislation, even if doubtful, we would
be required to sustain it. 9 Tex.Jur., p. 478. Neither are we at liberty
to invalidate it, though in our opinion same may be inexpedient or
unwise. 9 Tex. Jur., p. 490*2
The first sentence above quoted implies that the validity of the
Credit Insurance Act is not doubtful. But the opinion states that
even if it is doubtful they would be required to sustain it, citing as
"Wood v. Continental Say. & Bldg. Ass'n, 56 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex. Comm. App.
1933).81 See note 58, supra. The Dallas Court of Civil Appeals did not disapprove jury
findings that the lender charged the borrower credit insurance premiums with a purpose
of obtaining usury in Industrial Finance Service Co. v. Riley, 295 S.W.2d 498, 506
(Tex. Civ. App. 1956), reversed on other grounds, - Tex. -, 302 S.W.2d 652 (1957).
"2246 S.W.2d at 670.
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authority 9 Texas Jurisprudence 478. That reference reads as
follows:
It is but a decent respect to the wisdom, integrity and patriotism
of the legislative body by which any law is passed, to presume in favor
of its validity, until its violation of the constitution is proved beyond
all reasonable doubt."3
This general statement of course is true. But the violation of the
constitution by Section 6 is beyond reasonable doubt in view of its
clear violation of the constitutional prohibition of usury. 4 Also the
general presumption of validity does not apply in considering the
constitutional mandate to the Legislature to prevent usury by pains
and penalties." Therefore, 9 Texas Jurisprudence 478 is not valid
authority in this case for the court to say, "As to the validity of
this legislation, even if doubtful, we would be required to sustain it."
The other citation from Texas Jurisprudence given in support of
the opinion, quoted in full, states that:
An act of the legislature is said to be reviewable by the courts only
with respect to the issue as to whether it is in conflict with the pro-
visions of the constitution; and there is an abundance of authority in
support of the proposition that a statute may not be nullified on
grounds that it is in conflict with principles of natural justice, nor
that it will be productive of hardship. Nor may an act of the legis-
lature be set aside because it may appear to be unwise, inexpedient or
impolitic. 8
The first part of the first sentence quoted above states the basic
constitutional principle that the constitutionality of acts of the legis-
lature are reviewable by the courts. The basic issue in the Hatridge
case was supposed to be whether the Credit Insurance Act was in
conflict with any provision of the constitution. But a careful reading
of the opinion discloses that it never came to grips with this issue.
However, only the last sentence of the above citation was used to
support the statement in the opinion, "Neither are we at liberty to
invalidate it, though in our opinion same may be inexpedient or
unwise." But the issue that the court was treating was whether the
statute was unconstitutional and the court not only is at liberty to
invalidate a statute that is unconstitutional; it also has the duty to
do so.
Does the Hatridge case "legalize" usury? The answer is yes as long
83 9 TEX. JUR. 478.
84See pp. 437, 441, supra, and Davis, supra note 3, at 149-52.
85 See pp. 437, 438, supra, and Davis, supra note 3, at 146-47.
889 TEx. JUR. 490.
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as it is considered valid authority upholding the constitutionality of
Section 6 of the Texas Credit Insurance Act. This article is a frank
effort to convince the reader that the Hatridge case should not be
regarded as valid authority for its decision that Section 6 is con-
stitutional.
Should the question of the constitutionality of Section 6 come be-
fore a Texas appellate court again it is the writer's hope that what
has been written will help persuade the court that it has the duty
to invalidate Section 6 of the Texas Credit Insurance Act. It is the
writer's opinion that Texas is in dire need of a comprehensive and
effective small-loan law. But such law can never be achieved by per-
mitting the legislature to exercise unconstitutional powers or up-
holding its exercise of unconstitutional powers. Section 11 of article
XVI of the constitution should be amended so as to enable the legis-
lature to enact a valid small-loan law designed to permit legitimate
lenders to operate at a reasonable profit and designed to permit the
valid use of credit insurance.
